The ambiguous position of de facto regimes in international law has long been the subject of scholarly debate and a source of political conflict. An assessment of the current standing of these regimes in international law and the consequences of actions by international actors on this status has, however, been long overdue. The manner in which de facto regimes are regarded internationally has serious consequences for the individuals under the influence of this legal grey area. Therefore, the study into this problem and possible solutions is of great significance. The 2011 developments in Northern Africa underline the need of contemporary research into this area. This essay aims to clarify the position of de facto regimes in international law and the influence on their status by actions of international actors. The author first argues that de facto regimes have rights and obligations under international law, which provide them with (some form of ) international legal personality. He then pleads for a reconsideration of the contemporary legal treatment of these regimes. The author argues against the current system of government recognition and proposes a system that better addresses the needs of both de facto regimes and the international community.
Article facto' position, the words 'de facto' signifying the regime's factual control but illegal (or extralegal) foundations.
It is useful to distinguish DFRs from entities that are similar, but which differ in several crucial aspects. Firstly, the DFR should be distinguished from the de facto state. A de facto state is a geographical and political entity that has all the features of a state, 9 but is 'unable to achieve any degree of substantive recognition and therefore remains illegitimate in the eyes of international society'. 10 The entity that constitutes a de facto state seeks 'full constitutional independence and widespread recognition as a sovereign state'. 11 Examples of de facto states are the Republic of Somaliland 12 and the Republic of Kosovo. The entity that constitutes a DFR, on the other hand, aspires to be recognized by the international community as being the official government of an already existing state. 13 The important difference, therefore, between the de facto state and the de facto regime is the ambition behind its organization. While the de facto state pursues secession or independence from the parent state, the DFR seeks to be recognized as the official government, leaving the parent state and its territories intact.
Similarly, DFRs can be distinguished from national liberation movements. While national liberation movements strive for the liberation of a repressed 'people', 14 this is not necessarily the case for DFRs. 15 The DFR should also be distinguished from the de facto government. Although the terms are often used interchangeably, I would argue that this practice is not (in all instances) accurate. A de facto government is an entity that is in factual control over the complete territory of a state, but is not recognized as that state's government by the international community. The de facto regime, however, is an entity that does not necessarily control the entire territory of a state; its influence can also be less substantial. 16 The DFR's degree of control can range from power over small parts of the state to full control of the whole territory, after which it can also be identified as a de facto government. The distinguishing factor here is the degree of effective control over the respective state's territory. When an entity is in effective control of only certain parts of a state, it cannot be accurately labeled as the 'de facto government' of that state, but it can be identified as a DFR. Only when an entity is in full control of a state, but not recognized as a member of the international community, can the terms 'de facto government' and 'de facto regime' be used interchangeably. This means that a de facto government can always be identified as a de facto regime, but not vice versa.
Finally, DFRs can be differentiated from belligerent and insurgent groups. The difference here is the degree of political organization exercised by the group. Belligerents or insurgents do not (necessarily) require political motives and an effective organization to achieve their status, as is the case with DFRs. 17 This means that belligerents and insurgents can under certain circumstances acquire the status of DFRs (if the group exercises a certain degree of political authority and organizational ability), but that these groups cannot automatically be labeled as being DFRs.
To conclude, the DFR is a politically organized entity that exercises effective control over parts of a state with the aim of becoming the official government of that state. Because the regime is not (yet) part of the international community, it exercises its authority 'de facto' (signaling its illegal or at least extralegal foundation). Within this basic definition, individual DFRs exist in a myriad of forms that can change over time.
III. The Application of International Law to De Facto Regimes

A. De Facto Regimes and International Law
The identity of international actors -their international legal personality ('ILP')-is of central importance in determining how international law applies to them. Since its conception in German legal scholarship in the late 17 th century, 18 ILP has been used in international law to 'distinguish between those social actors the international legal system takes account of and those being excluded from it'. 19 As in any legal system this division was, and is still, necessary to clarify which parties fall under the law's authority and which do not. 20 Therefore it is argued that the international legal system 'has to determine whom it endows with the rights and duties contained in it and whose actions it takes account of by attaching legal consequences to them'. 21 ILP was created as a device that indicates whether an entity exists under international law and is 'recognized as having a separate legal identity'. 22 Historically, international law (and the rights and duties emanating from it) extends fully only to entities possessing complete international legal personality. Because of this, the principal addressees of international law have since its origin been states. 23 Statehood and ILP have at times even been 'regarded as synonymous'. 24 However, scholarly discourse has indicated that despite states being the primary and most undisputed international legal persons, it can be argued that other entities also (partially) possess ILP. Among these potential candidates are international organizations, 25 transnational corporations 26 and even individual persons.
27 These actors are bound to different sets of rights and obligations and therefore differ in their legal personality. According to the International Court of Justice ('ICJ') in the Reparations case: 'the subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community'. 28 In the remainder of this section, I will argue that DFRs possess at least some form of ILP and have to be regarded as relevant (legal) actors in the international community.
In understanding the degree of ILP that DFRs possess and in determining their place in the international community, an assessment needs to be made of the freedoms and responsibilities accorded to them. This seems contradictory; the title that gives DFRs their rights and duties in the international community is dependent on these rights and duties themselves. 29 However, these attributes are needed to create (and give personality to) an entity that is capable of acting on an international level. They are benchmarks that attest to the 'maturity', acceptance by other entities, and therefore, the ILP of the body in question. Although international law places DFRs in an indeterminate position, 'it does -in different forms-vest rights and obligations upon them'. 30 To fully understand the place taken by DFRs in the international judicial system, an assessment of these legal rights and duties is needed. Only after such an investigation can a definitive answer be given as to the degree of ILP DFRs possess, how international law applies to them and what their legal position is in the international community. In this investigation, a conclusion on the degree of ILP is not of ultimate importance. Of primary concern is the assessment of the international rights and duties accorded to DFRs.
Due to the ambiguous status of ILP accorded to DFRs, categorizing the legal rights and obligations of DFRs in the international community and in the domestic sphere is not without complications. This, however, does not mean that DFRs have no international rights or obligations: 'international law has (…) developed some rudimentary mechanisms to ensure that the developments on the ground are not entirely left to the (domestic) "laws" of anarchy'. 31 In the following paragraphs, I will first consider the rights and duties of DFRs in relation to other international actors. After that I will consider the application of international law to the domestic environment of DFRs. Finally, I will consider whether DFRs possess ILP and, if so, in what capacity.
B.
Legal Rights and Obligations in the International Community
International Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law ('IHL') is recognized as one of the most basic categories of international law and can partially be identified as customary international law. 32 IHL is defined as 'a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare'. 33 As DFRs often originate and exist in situations of (internal) conflict, with the opposing party usually being the parent state's government or another non-state entity, IHL deserves special attention. As set out below, DFRs are bound by rules of IHL. International criminal law, like IHL, includes basic and universal norms of international law often relied upon in situations of armed conflict. International criminal law applies to those crimes that are regarded as so grave that they 'constitute offence against the world community'. 34 As this includes war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture, an examination of its applicability to DFRs is necessary. 35 I will first consider the applicability of IHL to DFRs as entities and then proceed to briefly consider whether individuals who are part of these regimes are liable for prosecution under international criminal law.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Protocols are seen as the primary codification of the laws of war. Together, they constitute 'the body of international law that regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects'. 36 The majority of the provisions found in the Conventions apply to armed conflict on an international scale. A smaller portion of its rules applies to internal armed conflicts. These provisions require attention, as many DFRs are in armed conflict with the forces of their parent state. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions is seen as the absolute basis of IHL in the context of internal armed conflict. 37 This article provides that, during armed conflict, distinction should be made between those who take active part in hostilities and those who do not.
38 Accordingly, those not taking part in hostilities are protected against the most brutal forms of violence and acts that constitute grave violations of human dignity. The view that Common Article 3 binds 'each party' to an internal armed conflict (including DFRs), as its text suggests, is not self-evident, for States Parties to the Geneva Conventions are the entities primarily obliged to respect Common Article 3. 39 Holding DFRs that take part in an internal conflict accountable for violation of the standards of this article has therefore to rely on other foundations.
The most convincing evidence that the provisions of Common Article 3 are to be applied universally is the fact that the article is a customary rule. 40 As reiterated by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, Common Article 3 provides a 'minimum yardstick' in any armed conflict and reflects 'elementary considerations of humanity'. 41 Some authors go further and argue that Common Article 3 constitutes a 'general principle of humanitarian law' 42 and even jus cogens. 43 This indicates that Common Article 3 can be universally applied to all types of conflict. The universal legal nature of the article, coupled with its text, establishes its applicability to DFRs. The text of Common Article 3 requires 'each party to the conflict' to apply its provisions. 44 In his commentary to the first Geneva Convention, Jean Pictet (1952) reflects on the binding nature of Common Article 3 to nonstate entities by stating:
Until recently it would have been considered impossible in law for an international Convention to bind a non-signatory Party --a Party, moreover, which was not yet in existence and which was not even required to represent a legal entity capable of undertaking international obligations. Each of the Parties will thus be required to apply Article 3 by the mere fact of that Party's existence and of the existence of an armed conflict between it and the other Party. The obligation is absolute for each of the Parties, and independent of the obligation on the other Party. 45 As a reaction to the doubt expressed that non-state entities like DFRs can be bound to Article 3, Pictet further contends: 'if the responsible authority at their head exercises effective sovereignty, it is bound by the very fact that it claims to represent the country, or part of the country'. 46 The fact that Article 3 is of a customary nature and its provisions are 'legally binding on all parties to an (internal) armed conflict' 47 means that it is applicable to DFRs. 48 Article 3 applies regardless of whether their adversaries are represented by the parent state, or by other non-state entities.
Other fundamental provisions of IHL, as customary law, can also be universally applied to all parties in any conflict. This includes the prohibition of chemical weapons 49 and provisions included in Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. 50 These universal rules of IHL bind combatants in any armed conflict and are applicable in both an internal and international context. DFRs and their counterparts are therefore bound to respect them. It goes outside the scope of this essay to produce an exhaustive list of IHL provisions that bind DFRs through their inclusion in customary law or otherwise. However, the above shows that DFRs do indeed have, albeit rudimentary, obligations under IHL in both internal and international armed conflict.
2.
International Criminal Law
As with IHL, certain provisions of international criminal law ('ICL') apply to DFRs or, more accurately, individuals who are part of DFRs. As with IHL, norms of ICL are regarded as representing minimal standards of humanity. The crimes punishable under these central legal notions are seen as so abhorrent that prosecution of them must be generally available. These types of crimes, which are regarded as central to ICL and universally punishable, have been codified in Article 5 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court ('ICCst'). Article 5 of the Statute contains 'the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole'. 51 Its provisions are regarded as general principles of international criminal law and customary international law. 52 The international crimes contained in this Article are: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. 53 As ICL primarily applies to individuals, there are no direct difficulties applying most of the provisions of Article 5 to members of DFRs in the same way as they would apply to members of states.
54 Individuals who are part of DFRs are thus prohibited from committing genocide or war crimes, regardless of their membership in an entity with limited ILP. Enforcement of these measures does, however, presuppose jurisdiction of the ICC over the territory in which the DFR is situated. For instance, the members of the forces under Ouattara during their campaign against the military of the seated Ivorian government were prohibited from, inter alia, taking hostages or torturing. 55 The provisions of the ICCst define crimes against humanity as crimes committed 'pursuing or furthering a State or organizational policy to commit an attack against a civilian population'. 56 Because of this policy element, it was seen as necessary 'to include groups which constitute non-state actors as qualifying for the legal capacity to formulate such a policy' 57 so that the individuals of these groups can be prosecuted under the ICCst. Documents by international organizations and the practice of international tribunals have confirmed that non-state actors do indeed possess the capacity to devise and carry out policy as described in the articles of the ICCst. 58 The non-state actors now considered prosecutable under the ICCst 'must have some of the characteristics of state actors, which include the exercise of dominion or control over territory or people, or both, and the ability to carry out a "policy" similar in nature to that of "state action or policy"'. 59 As most DFRs possess these characteristics, it follows that individuals in these groups who commit crimes against humanity are liable for prosecution under the provisions of the ICCst, despite the limited ILP of their organization. The fact that the commission of crimes against humanity requires policy-making abilities does not exclude members of DFRs from the prohibition's scope. Therefore, international criminal law does apply to DFRs and its members.
The situation in Libya before the end of August 2011 can be used to illustrate the notions set out above. Firstly, the Libyan conflict featured 'protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups within a state', 60 as the Libyan government under Gadhafi and the NTC had been engaged in armed conflict since February 2011. As illustrated above, the NTC fell under the definition of 'DFR' and possessed organizational capacity. Furthermore, the NTC was an active party to the conflict, performing structured attacks against the Libyan military, which made them culpable as a group for illegal military action and individually for the perpetration of international crimes. These circumstances made the NTC, like other DFRs, bound by at least the basic provisions of IHL and ICL. It would, for instance, have been legally prohibited for the NTC's forces to purposely attack or torture unarmed civilians, make use of chemical weaponry or commit crimes against humanity.
To conclude, under international law, DFRs must respect at least some of the rules developed under IHL and ICL. Although these basic provisions only protect against the most barbarous forms of warfare and attacks on human dignity, they provide 'for a minimum set of humanitarian standards, which remain applicable in times when core human rights are endangered the most'. 
The Prohibition of the Use of Force
The prohibition of the use of force, as set out in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibits the 'threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations'. 62 The provision is 'regarded […] as a principle of customary international law' 63 and, according to some, 'even as jus cogens'. 64 It is disputed whether the customary character of the prohibition of the use of force in itself binds entities other than states.
65 Corten (2010) notes: 'at present, there is nothing to show that any general agreement has been observed in favour of the applicability of article 2(4) to situations that do not pertain to relations among States'. 66 This does not, however, mean that DFRs are never bound by the prohibition of the use of force.
In drafting the text of Article 2(4), several states proposed to explicitly 'extend applicability of the rule to all "political entities"', 67 including DFRs. The proposition met with 'firm opposition' from other states. 68 The fact that the literal inclusion of these groups was rejected in drafting the text of article 2(4), coupled with the consideration of state practice, lead Corten (2010) to conclude: 'Ultimately, no group of States has consistently defended an extension of the notion of 'international relations' as an essential element of the prohibition of the use of force'. 69 Conversely, Frowein (2009) argues: 'State practice, especially within the United Nations, clearly proves that the prohibition of the use of force applies […] to all independent de facto regimes'. 70 He bases this assumption on the UN Friendly Relations Declaration, 71 the General Assembly's Resolution 3314 and state practice. 72 Frowein concludes that DFRs are both protected by and bound to the prohibition of the use of force. 73 Although there does not seem to be unanimity in hard law, state practice, or literature, I would agree with Frowein that DFRs are (at least) partially bound by the prohibition of the use of force. 74 This assumption is supported by the scholarly discourse on the applicability of the use of force to actions of and reactions to the Taliban regime. 75 According to Wolfrum (2002) the Taliban, in its status as a DFR, enjoyed the right 'not to become the target of force as referred to in Article 2 para. 4 of the UN Charter'. 76 other DFRs. To conclude, I would argue that recent state practice and scholarly discourse support at least partial applicability of the prohibition of the use of force to DFRs.
C. Legal Rights and Obligations in the 'Domestic' Sphere
As indicated above, DFRs are bound to minimum obligations of IHL and ICL. These norms, especially those of ICL, do not only protect those under the control of other states and non-state actors, but also those in territory under control of the DFR. The principles of IHL and ICL applicable to DFRs provide its inhabitants protection from the most brutal forms of conduct by these regimes. Whether DFRs have obligations towards the individuals living under their authority besides these basic norms is less clear. Protection of persons in a domestic context is normally provided by human rights. 78 However, 'international human rights obligations still address mainly states as the primary guarantors (and violators) of human rights'. 79 Again, the level of ILP accorded to DFRs is problematic in the application of otherwise normal guarantees of human rights standards enjoyed by inhabitants of entities with full ILP.
Despite the ambiguous treatment of DFRs in international law and the 'reluctance to incorporate [them] into its framework', the international community is 'to the same extent reluctant -particularly in an area of major concern to human beingsto explicitly exclude [DFRs] from any "responsibility" for the harm inflicted [upon its inhabitants]'. 80 As is the case with international responsibility, effectiveness (and not legal rules) may be regarded as 'the primary criterion for the attribution of wrongful conduct' 81 Schoiswohl continues by stating that 'such a "functional" approach might […] be equally adopted to establish that de facto regimes face international (human rights) obligations in so far as their legitimate tasks of local governance might endanger the human rights of individuals living under their authority'. 89 Although these parallels can be disputed by pointing out that international organizations are created by states while DFRs are constituted in an illegal or extralegal manner, comparison is possible on the grounds of their similar level of ILP.
Although the above arguments for the imposition of human rights obligations on DFRs are not conclusive, it seems that the international community expresses a desire to hold DFRs to basic internal human rights norms. The limited ILP of DFRs does not take away from their potential liability in the field of human rights violations. While 'States remain the main providers and guarantors of human rights […] they do not hold a monopoly as evidenced by international organisations or de facto authorities exercising a similar degree of effectiveness which enables them to equally guarantee or violate human rights'. D.
International Legal Personality of De Facto Regimes
In the system of international legal personality, the position of DFRs is not easily defined. It is generally accepted that DFRs possess a limited degree of ILP, evident from the expectations of other international actors, but they are not accorded the same position that sovereign states and recognized governments have on the international legal plane. As the above has indicated, DFRs, 'which for one reason or the other cannot be regarded as States proper', 91 do indeed have the capacity to possess international rights and obligations. International norms regarding IHL and ICL, but also norms of international responsibility and 'domestic' protection of human rights, have been found to be applicable to de facto regimes. The need for order and the desire to bind DFRs to at least some international obligations has surpassed the reluctance of states to include them in the international community. As Schoiswohl (2001) argues, the application of international law to DFRs is inconsistent with denying these entities at least some degree of ILP. 92 Whether the accordance of rights and duties to these regimes is born more out of necessity and practical concern or out of ethical considerations and the willingness to include DFRs in international procedure is not critical in this assessment. The fact that DFRs are bound by international rights and obligations is in itself an indication of ILP, regardless of the acceptance of these regimes by other international actors into the international community. By this view, ILP is determined by the fact that entities like DFRs are expected to perform a certain way on the international plane, rather than ILP being a superimposed status that brings with it international rights and duties. 94 Furthermore, ILP is in this conception regarded as 'a merely descriptive device belonging to the realm of legal doctrine and as such being without concrete legal implications: being an international person thus simply reflects the sum of legal norms addressing a certain entity'. 95 The 'actor' conception as used by Portmann further deconstructs the idea of ILP as an a priori title that provides its subject with international rights and duties. It even avoids the concept of ILP and 'considers all entities exercising "effective powers" in the international "decision-making process"' as being 'participants' or 'actors' in the international community.
96 This participation on an international level is thus 'not based on legal rules or specific acts of recognition, but on effective power to participate'.
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The above has shown that the contemporary system of international law allows for the inclusion of regimes that are not in complete possession of (the classic form of ) ILP. This proposition can be based on different arguments and explained by understanding ILP in different forms (e.g., the 'formal' and 'actor' conceptions). These arguments and conceptions differ in their denial of the importance and norm-creating nature of ILP, but a common thread can be distinguished from the variety of theorems. This commonality is the notion that full ILP, as used before, is currently not considered necessary for an entity to function in international law. Whether states agree on the inclusion of DFRs in the international community or not, and whatever label is preferred to indicate their competence, their mere presence requires the international community to vest them with certain rights and duties. These rights and duties do, as shown above, accord DFRs with a status that can be considered ILP.
The decreased importance of ILP and the necessity of its possession as a prerequisite of participation in the international community also have important ramifications for the international practice of government recognition, as will be examined below.
IV. Recognition of De Facto Regimes
A. Recognition of De Facto Regimes in International Law
Definitions
Above I have considered the legal position of regimes that exist in a de facto capacity, which is to say that their governance relies on effective control and on an illegal or extralegal basis. In this section I will consider acts by international entities concerning these regimes and the effects that these acts have on their standing in the international community.
As DFRs seek to replace the seated government of their parent state, (partial) success in this pursuit brings about change in the international community. This shift of power is often unconstitutional and sometimes by force, and the international community has found it necessary to respond to these disruptions of the international order. Governmental recognition in international law is one such method governments use to respond to these changes. Shaw (2008) understands the recognition of governments in the following terms:
Recognition of an entity as the government of a state implies not only that this government is deemed to have satisfied the required conditions [of governance] but also that the recognizing state will deal with the government as the governing authority of the state and accept the usual legal consequences of such status.
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This duality, in the recognition of a factual situation and the willingness of the recognizing state to enter into relations, is supported by Talmon (1998): 'recognition of a government will express both the recognizing government's willingness to enter into official relations with it and its opinion that the government recognized exists as such'. 99 If states previously expressed doubts about a DFR's capacity to govern or perform actions on an international level, these doubts are removed by recognition. Recognition puts recognizing states in a position towards the DFR, which does not leave room for any limitations that might previously have been allowed. After recognition, the regime is seen by the recognizing state as the official government of its parent state, which has important consequences. As Peterson (1997) notes: 'those who rule domestically also serve as the state's agents in international affairs -exercising its rights, ensuring fulfillment of its obligations, and committing its resources and reputation in relations with other states and other types of actor on the world scene'. 100 As the ambition of a DFR is to become the government of its parent state, recognition is of importance not only to that regime, but also to those who will cooperate with the regime in its capacity as an official government. A state's decision to recognize a DFR, vesting them with rights in relation to the recognizing state, is thus not taken lightly and is made only after careful deliberation.
The theory of government recognition has since its conception been the subject of debate. According to Freeman (1950) this controversy is the result of the political aspects of governmental recognition: 'the subject [of recognition] is one of enormous complexity, principally because it is an amalgam of political and legal elements which is unusual even for international law'. 101 The fact that government recognition opens the door to all kinds of legal interaction between states and new governments (former DFRs) seems to imply that it is indeed a legal practice. However, it cannot be denied that governmental recognition is also a highly political affair. Kelsen (1941) acknowledges this duality and separates governmental recognition in its capacity as a political and a legal act. 102 The political act provides that 'the recognizing state is willing to enter into political and other relations with the recognized […] government'. 103 This political act, according to Kelsen, 'has no legal effect whatsoever' and is therefore 'not constitutive for the legal existence of the recognized state or government'. 104 The legal aspect of recognition has the effect 'that the recognized community becomes in its relations with the recognizing state in itself a […] a subject of rights and obligations stipulated by international law'. 105 It is therefore 'the establishment of a fact; it is not the expression of a will'. 106 This view accurately reflects the manner in which government recognition is used, while providing for both the political and legal side of its process.
Government recognition is, mainly because of its political affiliation, a highly disputed legal problem. Its solution or the creation of universal guidelines for recognition is made more difficult by the fact that it 'leads in the practice of states to […] paradoxical situations'. 107 Nonetheless, understanding the various forms and consequences of governmental recognition is crucial in understanding the position of DFRs in the international community and their relations to other international entities. In the next sections I will assess the current process of governmental recognition, highlight its ambiguities and propose a more useful system. 2.
Forms and Misconceptions
Governmental recognition can be seen as a category, which includes different individual forms. 108 It can, in its different capacities, be used in different ways that reflect the opinions and motivations of the recognizing government.
Historically, recognition has been divided into de jure and de facto recognition. Recognition de jure can be regarded as the 'pure' and full form of recognition. De jure recognition 'follows where the recognizing state accepts that the effective control displayed by the [new] government is permanent and firmly rooted and that there are no legal reasons detracting from this'. 109 De facto recognition is regarded as a second form of recognition. De facto recognition is used to indicate a hesitance on the side of the recognizing state in according de jure recognition. 110 It is further used as 'a simple acknowledgement that a government exists and wields effective control over people and territory'.
111 As a disputed category of recognition, it poses difficulties in understanding the legal system of government recognition. De facto recognition disconnects, as it were, the dual function of recognition (the acknowledgement that the new government exists and the willingness to enter into diplomatic relations with it). This means that de facto recognition is usually accompanied by disapproval of the recognizing state towards the new regime, or at least the expectancy of certain improvements before de jure recognition is granted. De facto recognition is also regarded as being open to withdrawal, as opposed to de jure recognition.
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Lauterpacht (1947) defends the notion and practice of de facto recognition. He argues that 'de facto and de jure recognition are [both] legal acts' and 'terms expressive not of any judgment upon the legitimacy of the recognized authority from the point of view of the constitutional law of the State concerned, but upon its claim to be considered as validly and effectively representing the State or territory in question'.
113 I would, however, argue that de facto recognition is not a legal practice and that it is solely used to express political opinions under the pretense of international law. 114 De facto recognition does not create a new legal relationship between the recognizing state and the recognized DFR (which is precisely the aim of de facto recognition). It does not create any obligations for any of the parties, but is somehow regarded as holding the key for cooperation that is otherwise not possible. I would argue that de facto recognition is in fact an extension of the choice between recognition and abstention from recognition. Whereas the recognizing government expresses favoritism towards one of the rivaling groups, 115 abstention from recognition achieves the same legal position as de facto recognition (namely, expressing reservations to recognition) and leaves the door open for political contact that would be available in the context of de facto recognition. Talmon (1998) states that 'de facto recognition must have a meaning other than the mere negation of de jure recognition'. 116 He bases this on the fact that some states express that they 'do not (want to) recognize a certain government […], either de jure "or" de facto '. 117 According to this view, states that recognize de facto indicate something above non-recognition, but below de jure recognition. However, the fact that states have different intentions when they express de facto recognition than when expressing de jure recognition does not make it viable as a legal practice. I would argue that this grey area between full recognition and its denial is neither productive, nor legally sustainable. It indicates the opinion of the recognizing state towards the DFR and its diplomatic intentions, but it does not in itself create binding relations between the entities. Furthermore, de facto recognition seems to presume that, without it, the factual situation on the ground does not exist. As Brown (1942) states: 'if people have grouped together for a political purpose, on a given territory, and are independent, it would be obviously absurd to say that they do not exist'.
118 Therefore, de facto recognition is not necessary because the de facto situation (and, as has been shown above, the DFR itself ) exists regardless of recognition by another entity.
For these reasons, de facto recognition can be considered as a way to identify the opinion expressed by a government towards a DFR, but nothing more. Rather than a menu from which governments choose a method of recognition, it can be used as a chart on which the position of a government towards a DFR can be placed. De facto recognition (as a 'label') is therefore useful in situations where two factions (usually the government and a DFR) are contesting effective control over an area. facto recognition should be understood as abstention from recognition, coupled with acknowledgement of a factual situation. In this manner, it can be used by governments to indicate which entity is regarded as the dominant or favored one in their struggle for dominance. It is not a legal practice, as it does not produce legal consequences for either of the parties. However, despite its controversial nature, de facto recognition is still practiced in the international community.
119
Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, the varying application of governmental recognition has recently caused confusion in the international press and among the general public. At the heart of this ambiguous situation is the fact that there can be only one legitimate and recognized government of a State at only one point in time. 120 Therefore, it is not possible for a government to have full (legal) international relations with both a DFR and the government of its parent state. This is further complicated by the fact that recognition is often presumed before it has been officially given by governments. What is generally perceived as full or de jure recognition often is not full government recognition. An example of this was the diplomatic reaction of governments to the situation in Libya in 2011 and its reception in the international press. The major problem in this case was that the condemnation of the Gadhafi regime, coupled with the willingness to open consular or diplomatic relations with the National Transitional Council (which presumed acknowledgement of a degree of effective control on the side of the NTC), was conceived as (de jure) governmental recognition. This presumption is not correct, for the mere approval by government officials of the NTC in combination with the disapproval of the Gadhafi government is in itself not enough to create any legal effects between the approving government and the DFR. When, for instance, German Foreign Minister Westerwelle stated in June 2011 that Gadhafi's government had 'lost legitimacy' 121 and that 'the national council is the legitimate representative of the Libyan people', 122 this was not an expression of recognition. 123 When the German government 'recognized' the Libyan rebels, it did so to express its preference for the NTC and disapproval of the Libyan military. It did not intend to create any legal relation between itself and the NTC. Although presented as de jure recognition by international media, 124 the sole expression of approval of the NTC's actions and the willingness to negotiate with its leaders is not sufficient for it to constitute an act of recognition on behalf of the German government. I would argue that the practice of de facto recognition can be useful in 'labeling' certain actions by governments and categorizing a group of ambiguous motivations expressed towards the recognized subject, but not as a legal practice. As seen above, regarding de facto recognition or methods other than de jure recognition as legally viable causes unnecessary confusion. Below, I will consider more useful approaches to government recognition.
As opposed to de facto recognition, de jure recognition does have a legal effect on the relation between the recognizing state and the DFR. For instance, the statements made by French officials during the Libyan conflict concerning the NTC can be seen as expressions according de jure recognition to the Libyan DFR. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppé, stated on 7 June 2011:
Ever since its creation, France has considered the Libyan National Transitional Council to be its legitimate political partner and intends to provide it with its full support in building a free, united and democratic Libya.
[…] The National Transitional Council is the only holder of governmental authority in the contacts between France and Libya and its related entities.
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This statement undoubtedly expresses a willingness to enter into full diplomatic relations with the NTC and recognition of factual control over Libyan territory exercised by the Council. Therefore, this statement (and others made by the French government) can be regarded as an expression of recognition, as opposed to those made by Germany in June 2011 and by other states.
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De jure recognition has legal implications and substantially changes relationships in the international order. It creates clarity and is not open to unreliable promises by uncertain governments, as is the case with de facto recognition. DFRs often
3.
'Capacity' Recognition Government recognition is used in different ways to express an opinion on the factual situation created by the DFR and on the degree of willingness to enter into relations with the DFR. A productive way to understand government recognition, as opposed to using the black-and-white models of de jure and de facto recognition, is to consider the motives of the recognizing government in acknowledging DFRs. As Brownlie (2008) notes: 'the distinction between "de jure /de facto recognition"
[…] is insubstantial, more especially as the question is one of intention and the legal consequences thereof in the particular case'. 128 The recognizing government's motives can collectively be considered to represent its stance towards a DFR. Instead of deducing the opinions and legal expectations of the recognizing government from the (supposed) form of recognition, it is more useful to consider the intent and to draw conclusion from this.
A way to deduce the motives of recognizing states and to clarify their desired legal relation is examining what capacity is accorded to the DFR by the recognizing government. As Talmon (2011) argues: 'the imperative question in legal terms is not recognition per se but recognition as what'.
129 Talmon goes on to quote Winston Churchill when he stated: 'one can recognize a man as an Emperor or as a Grocer. Recognition is meaningless without a defining formula'. 130 This holds true for international relations; governmental recognition in itself is non-specific. One needs context and knowledge of the recognizing government's attitude towards the DFR to make meaningful conclusions about the legal effect. Therefore, it is important to understand the capacity in which a DFR is accorded recognition.
Firstly, DFRs can be recognized as being the 'representative of a people'. 131 This accords them the possibility of (basic) consular relations with the recognizing government and indicates that the recognizing government sees the DFR as a separate entity from the parent state's government. This practice does not, however, amount (and is not intended to amount) to any legal form of governmental recognition. It is simply a statement by a government indicating its willingness to negotiate with a DFR. It is often used to express disapproval of an old government and the willingness towards a DFR to enter into negotiations. It can often also be seen as a first step towards (official and legal) recognition, in which the recognizing government sets out its conditions for possible future recognition de jure. However, this form of recognition has no (legal) effect on the relationship between the recognizing state and the government of the DFR's parent state. Again, a state can have only one government at a time. When Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov recognized the NTC as 'a legitimate partner at the talks about Libya's future', 132 this left 'intact the international legal status of the incumbent Qaddafi government as the government of Libya'. 133 According to Talmon (2011), recognition of a DFR as the legitimate representative of a people does hold several advantages for the recognized party:
(1) it legitimizes the struggle of the group against the incumbent government; (2) it provides international acceptance; (3) it allows the group to speak for the people in international organizations and represent it in other States by opening "representative offices"; and (4) it usually results in financial aid. it considers the DFR's capacity to fully represent its parent state and considers its ability to perform all its international rights and duties. Recognition of a DFR as the representative of its parent state amounts to full (de jure) recognition. As opposed to the form of recognition considered above, it does have legal implications. 136 Following the 'London Conference on Libya' in March 2011, the Libya Contact Group ('LCG') was instituted, comprising more than 20 individual governments including those of the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany.
137 On 15 July 2011, the group met in Istanbul to consider its standpoint towards the seated Libyan government under Gadhafi and the aspiring Libyan government under the NTC. At this meeting, the LCG:
reaffirmed that the Qaddafi regime no longer has any legitimate authority in Libya and that Qaddafi and certain members of his family must go. Henceforth and until an interim authority is in place, participants agreed to deal with the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the legitimate governing authority in Libya. 138 By collectively issuing this statement, the governments that comprise the LCG seemed to have accorded de jure recognition to the NTC. Akande (2011) finds that this statement 'is clear recognition, by members of the Contact Group, of the NTC as the government of Libya'. 139 As the Group regarded the reign of Gadhafi illegitimate and recognized the NTC as the sole representative of the Libyan state, this was indeed the case. For some countries, like Germany, this meant a change in their policy towards the government under Gadhafi and the NTC as they earlier accorded only de facto recognition to the NTC. Accordingly, political and legal bonds had to be severed between the Group's members and the Gadhafi regime, and opened with the NTC.
One could argue that considering 'as what' DFRs are recognized, is no different from using the practice of de facto recognition versus de jure recognition. When a government recognizes de facto, it seems to recognize a DFR as being a de facto government (and thus having the capacity of a de facto government). There are, however, important differences. First of all, de facto (or de jure) recognition is in and of itself not the same as 'capacity' recognition. As Chen (1951) notes: 'de facto (or de jure) recognition is descriptive of the character of the act of recognition'.
140 Recognition as having a certain capacity (being the representative of a people or of the parent state) is 'descriptive of the character of the thing recognized'. 141 Chen continues by stating: 'to say that a de facto recognition is recognition as a de facto government is an obvious contradiction in terms '. 142 There are other reasons to prefer the 'capacity'-method of recognition to de facto (and de jure) recognition.
When a government recognizes a DFR as a representative of a people, it provides clarity in its intentions towards that regime. It indicates a willingness to negotiate and recognizes the factual existence of the DFR. When a DFR is recognized as a de facto government, this can be meant as an expression of several differing (sometimes conflicting) intentions and opinions. 143 De facto recognition, moreover, does not indicate the intentions of the recognizing state, other than its refusal to recognize fully. When a government is recognized as the representative of a people, this ambiguity is avoided. The DFR is simply acknowledged for what it is and the recognizing state expresses its willingness to cooperate with it to a certain degree. Therefore, in examining the reactions of governments to DFRs, the 'capacity' methods of recognition are preferable to the forms of de facto and de jure recognition.
B. Legal Effects of Governmental Recognition
After considering the methods of recognition and their merits, it is necessary to examine the legal effects of recognizing DFRs. In examining these effects, I will mainly concentrate on the full form of recognition, as this type of recognition has substantial legal effects (as opposed to other methods of recognition).
Declaratory and Constitutive Theories
The discourse on the effects of recognition has traditionally been divided between those adhering to a constitutive and those adhering to a declaratory view. system is "constituted" by the recognition of the other entities making up that system'. 144 In this view, DFRs are effectively transformed into a state's government by the actions of other governments. Conversely, those defending a declaratory standpoint argue that 'the authority of a new Government exists prior to recognition and the act of recognition is merely a formal acknowledgement or admission of an already existing fact'. 145 Here, the DFR first acquires a dominant position vis-avis the former government of its state, which is later confirmed or denied by third states. It goes outside of the scope of this article to consider in full the scholarly debate between supporters of the two theories. It is, however, constructive to use both views in analyzing recent state practice and discourse. This clarifies the contemporary effects of government recognition on the status of DFRs.
International legal personality can be used in considering the contemporary merits of both theories and in clarifying the position of governmental recognition. If the ILP of DFRs changes after recognition by existing governments (i.e. the DFR attains a higher level of ILP after recognition), such would evidence a constitutive system. If governmental recognition does not change the ILP of a DFR, this would indicate a declaratory system. The importance of this consideration lies more in the change of ILP after recognition than in concluding which of the two systems is more in line with current legal realities. The actual effects of recognition are more important than the label used to categorize these effects.
Are declaratory views more in line with state practice and contemporary legal reality than constitutive views? As with any legal consideration on the basis of practice and discourse, it depends on what weight is given to which aspects. As seen in earlier sections, DFRs have certain rights and duties under international law, providing them with a certain form of ILP. In this section I will consider whether recognition is required for a DFR to attain full ILP in the international community. In doing so, it is necessary to consider the effects of recognition in both bilateral and multilateral relations. In this assessment it is important to realize that once a DFR is recognized as the government of its parent state, this automatically means that its old government is no longer recognized. This means that recognition not only creates norms, but also severs ties with formerly recognized governments.
Recognition in Bilateral Relations
As argued above, when a government recognizes a DFR, it expresses both the acceptance of the factual existence of the regime as a state's government as well as a willingness to enter into diplomatic relations with it in this capacity. As Kelsen (1941) argues: 'the recognized community becomes in its relation with the recognizing state itself (…) a subject of rights and obligations stipulated by general international law '. 146 But what exactly changes in the relationship in the instance of recognition? Which rights and obligations are created between the recognizing and newly recognized governments that did not exist before? I will mainly consider two practices that are crucial for the day-to-day cooperation between governments: diplomatic and consular relations. I will also devote special attention to an important ramification of the change in diplomatic relations in a bilateral context: the acceptance of immunities between the two governments.
Firstly, recognition by a government is an expression of a willingness to have full and unconditional diplomatic relations. Therefore, 'the recognized [government] acquires the capacity to enter into diplomatic relations […] with the recognizing State'. 147 These relations are more significant than those existing after recognition as a representative of a people, or de facto recognition, and tolerate more than low-level negotiations or basic consular relations. It is, for instance, possible after recognition for a recognized state to enter into bilateral treaties with a recognizing government; a practice that is not available before full recognition. 148 Aside from the ability to conclude treaties, consular relations are an important aspect of international diplomatic relations. Consular relations available after recognition differ from those that are possible before recognition. Consider, for instance, the opening of German offices in Benghazi before Berlin recognized the NTC, compared to the relations between the UK and the Libyan opposition after recognition. When Germany opened its 'liaison office' in Benghazi in June 2011, this was done to 'establish continuous contact with the Interim National Council there and to assist the German support measures for the population of eastern Libya'. 149 This consular representation was, however, one-sided. The NTC was not given the chance to open similar offices in Germany. Also, Germany at the time maintained consular disapproval of the Gadhafi regime coupled with considerations for justice, peace and stability were given more weight than effective control. While some argue that decisions of recognition based on something other than effective control are illegal and premature, recent state practice seems to confirm that factors such as popular support and stability of the international community outweigh the (possibly outdated) legal principle of 'effectivité'.
V. Conclusions
The presence of de facto regimes continues to pose challenges to the international community. While their existence cannot be denied, the extent of their international rights and duties remains open to debate. Moreover, appropriate responses by established governments in the form of recognition, which is necessary to definitively secure a position in international law, is not always provided. The position of DFRs is not only a question of legal semantics but also has consequences for those under the control of the regime (or the seated government of its parent state) and for international stability.
De facto regimes are subjects of international law and possess a certain degree of international legal personality. DFRs have both rights (e.g. the protection from the use of force), which they can invoke against actors that violate them, and duties under international law (e.g. IHL obligations), to which they can be held responsible. Still, DFRs are not accorded full ILP. Governments seem to find it necessary to express their disapproval of these regimes by not (fully) including them in international decision-making. Such policies will continue to prevent DFRs from being fully operational international actors, blocking meaningful cooperation with them and making it impossible to expect their full adherence to international norms. Only if DFRs are given a meaningful place in the international legal order, i.e. by according them full ILP, can they be held fully responsible for international standards deemed obligatory for other international actors. According DFRs full ILP is not just in the interest of other international actors whose rights might be violated, but also the individuals living under their control. It is only through according DFRs full ILP that 'the international community will finally lift its rather hypocritical veil of ignorance and abandon its prevailing reluctance to denounce as well as to impeach de facto regimes, which defy international (human rights) standards to the detriment of the individual living under de facto subjugation'.
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As of now, a DFR's only opportunity to be included in the international community is through recognition as the parent state's government. It is only after recognition that the DFR attains full ILP as the government of a state. Recognition is only meaningful in a de jure capacity for precisely this reason. When a DFR is recognized de facto it is recognized as the thing that it already is, namely a de facto regime, making de facto recognition a pointless exercise and not a legal practice; it is merely an expression of the political attitude of the recognizing government towards a DFR and its parent state. Because governments, apparently, find it necessary to be able to have control over which entity they want to include in their community and with which group of persons they want to negotiate, governmental recognition is not likely to disappear. It is hoped that in the future, this practice will be used in a way that creates transparency for all actors involved and will be used more as a legal than a political practice. The confusion among the general public and government officials in regards to the recognition of the NTC as Libya's official government as well as the ousting of Gbagbo in favor of Ouattara should inspire a reconsideration of the legal practice of governmental recognition and the international position accorded to de facto regimes.
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